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701 
DRUG SMUGGLING ON THE HIGH SEAS:  
USING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION OVER THE 
ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRADE AND THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S UNNECESSARY NEXUS 
REQUIREMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International drug smuggling is probably the fastest-growing industry 
in the world and is unquestionably the most profitable. The global drug 
trade produces approximately $400 billion a year in annual revenue.
1
 The 
U.S. market, the world‘s largest, produces revenues of at least $100 billion 
at retail—twice what U.S. consumers spend for oil.2 Drug smugglers 
employ every conceivable means of transportation to move their illicit 
cargo, but maritime conveyance continues to be the predominant method 
for smuggling drugs into the United States.
3
 
To combat maritime conveyance, the United States annually spends 
over $8 billion in federal resources
4
 and has enacted a series of laws that 
attempt to extend U.S. authority into the high seas. Prosecutions under 
these laws have led to a series of challenges by foreign nationals who 
argue that the United States does not have jurisdiction over their actions. 
These jurisdictional challenges have been almost universally rejected by 
U.S. courts, which commonly find that international legal principles are 
sufficient for the extraterritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has rejected the sufficiency of these 
principles and determined that, as a precursor to jurisdiction, the 
government must establish a nexus between the defendant‘s conduct and 
 
 
 1. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2006 World Drug Report, 363–67, U.N. Doc. 
UNIS/NAR/849 (June 25, 2006). 
 2. Louis Kraar, The Drug Trade: Think of It as a Huge, Multinational Commodity Business with 
a Fast-moving Top Management, a Widespread Distribution Network, and Price-insensitive 
Customers, FORTUNE, June 20, 1988, at 27. 
 3. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL: UPDATE ON U.S. INTERDICTION EFFORTS 
IN THE CARIBBEAN AND EASTERN PACIFIC 3 (1997). 
 4. OFFICE OF NAT. DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, FY 2008 
BUDGET SUMMARY 67 (2008). But see Patrick Murphy, Keeping Score: The Frailties of the Federal 
Drug Budget (Rand Drug Policy Research Ctr., IP-138 (1/94), 1994) (questioning the methodology 
used by the federal government in compiling its total budget, arguing that the algorithms used to 
calculate this figure are vulnerable to manipulation, and hypothesizing that the official figures may 
overstate the federal government's expenditures on antidrug activities).  
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the United States.
5
 The Ninth Circuit argues that this nexus requirement, 
which is generally interpreted as knowledge that the illicit substances 
being smuggled are headed for the U.S. market, is necessary because of 
due process and fairness concerns.
6
 The difficulties the nexus requirement 
creates for federal prosecutors attempting to bring cases in the Ninth 
Circuit are illustrated by the details of a recent decision in which the 
circuit overturned a conviction for failure to establish a nexus.  
In the predawn hours of September 11, 2000, members of the Coast 
Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Team (―LEDET‖) attached to the 
USS De Wert
7
 monitored via radar a suspicious rendezvous between the 
supposed fishing vessel Gran Tauro
8
 and a yet-to-be-identified vessel.
9
 
The team members expected that they would soon witness an integral step 
in high seas drug smuggling—the resupplying of a ―Go-Fast‖ boat from a 
―logistical support vessel.‖10 Just before dawn, the team was alerted to a 
 
 
 5. See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that ―[w]here an 
attempted transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient 
basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction‖).  
 6. United States. v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 7. Id. at 1152. The USS De Wert is a United States Navy frigate that was assigned to patrol the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru as part of the United States‘ 
maritime surveillance efforts aimed at abating the traffic in illicit narcotics. Id. The ship was located in 
the Eastern Pacific because it is the least patrolled, and thus safest, method of smuggling cocaine from 
South America to the United States. Interview with William Gallo, Assistant United States Attorney 
for the Southern District of California, lead prosecutor of United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria and 
United States v. Perlaza (Nov. 11, 2007). There are three main transit corridors often used to transport 
drugs between the source (typically, Colombia) and the destination (typically, Central Mexico) 
countries. One is through the territorial seas of South and Central American countries. Another forms a 
straight line from Colombia to Mexico. The third, and least used because of cost and logistics, is 
through the high seas of the ―middle Pacific, sufficiently west of the Central and South America coasts 
to make detection unlikely.‖ Id.  
 8. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1152. The Gran Tauro was a fishing vessel that was flying the 
Colombian flag. It was eventually determined that the vessel‘s crew was comprised exclusively of 
Colombian citizens. See id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. The Coast Guard based this expectation on their previous search of the Gran Tauro, 
conducted under the authority of a bilateral agreement with Colombia, which revealed that the vessel 
was traveling in an area unauthorized by the Colombian government, had poorly maintained fishing 
nets, had only one fish in its hold, and was carrying approximately 6,000 gallons of unauthorized 
gasoline that the vessel could not use. The agreement between the United States and Colombia referred 
to was the ―Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
Republic of Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea‖ (―the Colombian bilateral agreement‖). Id. at 
1154. This agreement allowed the United States to board Colombian ships for the purpose of 
suppressing the narcotics trade that originated in Colombia and was often targeted at the United States. 
The agreement complied with standard concepts of sovereignty and maritime law by requiring that the 
United States receive permission from the Colombian government before boarding any Colombian 
vessel. The fishing vessel‘s conduct was regulated by the Colombian government pursuant to a zarpe, 
which is a ―written permit—akin to a visa for marine vessels—authorizing a vessel to leave port and 
restricting the scope and duration of the vessel‘s voyage.‖ Id. at 1154 n.4 (citing Solano v. Gulf King 
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fast-moving vessel traveling directly toward the Gran Tauro‘s position 
and quickly launched the De Wert‘s helicopter.11 As the team approached 
the location, they observed a Go-Fast heading away from the Gran Tauro 
and began tracking it.
12
 After their presence was detected, the Go-Fast‘s 
crew jettisoned its illicit cargo
13
 and circled back toward the Gran Tauro.
14
 
A few minutes later, the Go-Fast smashed into the stern of the Gran 
Tauro, causing the smaller boat to capsize.
15
 The crew of the Gran Tauro 
never even went to the stern to survey the damage.
16
  
Responding to the crash, the LEDET team rescued the crew of the 
now-capsized Go-Fast, boarded and searched the Gran Tauro, and arrested 
her crew.
17
 On October 11, 2000, the crews of both vessels were indicted 
by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of California on violations 
of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (―MDLEA‖).18 Both crews 
 
 
55, Inc., 212 F.3d 902, 904 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Gran Tauro‘s zarpe restricted the vessel to fishing in 
Buenaventura Zones 2 and 3. The zarpe also only allowed the Gran Tauro, which ran on diesel fuel 
and could only use gasoline to power its generators and pumps, to carry two fifty-five-gallon drums of 
gasoline. After this information was relayed by the LEDET team to the Colombian government, the 
government ordered the Gran Tauro to return to Buenaventura and report to the Port Captain. Id. at 
1154–55. After leaving the Gran Tauro, the LEDET team continued to monitor the fishing vessel by 
helicopter and infrared camera and observed that the vessel neither left the area nor engaged in fishing 
activities. Id. at 1155. 
 ―Go-Fast boat‖ is a term used by Coast Guard officials to describe speed boats used to transfer 
and land drugs. Id. at 1153 n.2. These vessels are referred to as Go-Fast boats ―because they can travel 
at high rates of speed, which makes them a favored vehicle for drug . . . smuggling operations.‖ United 
States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 
1088, 1092 (11th Cir. 2002)). These vessels can vary in size from twenty-five to approximately forty-
five feet and have a range of up to 1500 miles. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1153 n.2. 
 The term logistical support vessels ―was adopted following the shift in drug smuggling from the 
Caribean [sic] to the Eastern Pacific and the discovery that fishing boats from Latin America were 
carrying extra fuel, food, and crew for smugglers aboard the Go-Fasts.‖ Id. at 1153 n.3. Operation of 
this smuggling route ―requires the use of speedboats to transfer and land drugs and larger logistical 
support vessels (‗LSVs‘) to serve as roving refueling stations.‖ Id. at 1153. Though circumstantial 
evidence strongly suggests this course of conduct, no United States vessel has ever witnessed a 
rendezvous between an LSV and a speedboat. Id. at 1154. 
 11. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1155. The team was alerted after the advanced radar screens aboard the 
destroyer showed a ―merge‖ between the two signals, indicating that the vessels were no more than 
300 yards apart. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. The Go-Fast ejected 1,964 kilograms of cocaine and at least a dozen fifty-five-gallon 
gasoline drums. This material was picked up by crew members of the De Wert. Id. at 1156. 
 14. Id. at 1155. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1155–56. 
 18. The crews of both boats were charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, aboard a vessel, in violation of parts (a), (c), and (j) of the MDLEA. Id. at 1157–58. The 
crew of the Go-Fast was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, on a vessel, 
in violation of MDLEA § 1903(a), (c)(1)(A), (f). Id. at 1157. 
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were eventually tried and found guilty.
19
 On appeal, the convictions were 
overturned by the Ninth Circuit.
20
  
The trial of the crews of the Gran Tauro and the Go-Fast in U.S. 
federal court raises many issues of maritime and international law, chiefly, 
(1) whether the United States‘ claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a 
Colombian vessel and her crew traveling on the high seas is consistent 
with international legal principles and valid under United States law, and 
(2) whether due process under the U.S. Constitution requires that federal 
prosecutors prove that a nexus exists between the actions of a given 
defendant and the United States?  
Part II of this Note describes the requirements for extending the 
jurisdiction of the MDLEA extraterritorially. This part also briefly 
describes the concept of jurisdiction, the expansion of modern 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the inherent power of the Constitution for 
extending jurisdiction into the high seas, the legislative history of 
MDLEA, and its expression of the necessary congressional intent to 
extend jurisdiction extraterritorially. Part III introduces the unique nexus 
requirement of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This part also explains 
why the nexus requirement is an unnecessary burden and examines the 
international agreements that can be used as an alternative to international 
legal principles to justify extraterritorial application of the MDLEA. 
Lastly, Part IV describes the proper way for resolving the nexus dispute: 
for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a high seas smuggling case and 
find the nexus requirement superfluous because the combination of 
international legal principles and international treaties is sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction.  
II. THE EXTENSION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER ACTS ON 
THE HIGH SEAS 
Federal courts require the government to establish statutory and 
constitutional adjudicative jurisdiction over a defendant before they will 
find that the United States has validly exerted extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over drug smugglers apprehended beyond U.S. territorial waters.
21
 Part II 
of this Note briefly describes the basic concept of jurisdiction, the inherent 
power of the Constitution to extend jurisdiction into the high seas, the 
 
 
 19. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1157. 
 20. Id. at 1178. 
 21. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160–61. The court noted the different jurisdictional requirements, 
but then concentrated on the due process rights of the defendants. See id. at 1161–78. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/5
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legislative history of MDLEA and its expression of the necessary 
congressional intent for extending jurisdiction extraterritorially, and the 
use of international legal principles to establish prescriptive jurisdiction. 
A. Jurisdiction Generally 
Effective analysis of extraterritorial application of the MDLEA 
requires a precise definition of jurisdiction so that a clear distinction can 
be drawn between the right to make rules and the right to enforce them.
22
 
The term ―jurisdiction‖ is derived from the Latin roots juris (meaning law) 
and dictio (meaning saying), ―the implication being an authoritative legal 
pronouncement.‖23 This pronouncement plays a crucial role in the 
relationship between a sovereign state and its people as it defines their 
legal relationship and establishes a clear statement of the state‘s power 
over the individual.
24
 The importance of this pronouncement cannot be 
overstated; ―if a state has no jurisdiction over a particular individual, it has 
no legal authority to subject that individual to its laws and legal process.‖25 
This concept is not limited to defining the relationship between sovereign 
and subject as jurisdiction also defines the legal relationship between a 
state and other sovereign powers.
26
 In this context, jurisdiction is referred 
to as ―national jurisdiction, domestic jurisdiction, or . . . ‗sovereignty.‘‖27 
This claim of authority does not have the indicia of strength associated 
with jurisdiction over an individual, as the sovereign is attempting to 
exercise control over actions that occur outside its territorial boundaries. 
These two forms of jurisdiction ―may also overlap; in such cases there is 
‗concurrent‘ jurisdiction.‖28  
To allow for greater consideration and understanding, jurisdiction is 
often divided into three subcategories: prescriptive,
29
 adjudicative,
30
 and 
statutory or enforcement.
31
  
 
 
 22. Chrisopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 1, 12 (2007). 
 23. Id. (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 38 (3d ed. 1982)). 
 24. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and 
the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 121, 126 (2007). See also 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2004) (defining jurisdiction as a ―government‘s general 
power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory; esp[ecially] a state‘s power 
to create interests that will be recognized under common-law principles as valid in other states‖).  
 25. Colangelo, supra note 24, at 126. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) 
(1987). Jurisdiction to prescribe is defined by the Restatement as the ability of a state ―to make its law 
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B. Statutory Jurisdiction of the MDLEA: Constitutional Authority and 
Congressional Intent to Act 
In order for the MDLEA to satisfy prescriptive jurisdiction, the 
Constitution of the United States must grant Congress the authority to 
enact a statute governing the proscribed behavior and Congress must 
express the necessary intent to regulate the conduct.
32
  
1. Constitutional Authority for the MDLEA 
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
―define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations.‖33 An examination of an early draft34 
and the legislative history
35
 of this powerful document shows that the 
Framers were concerned about whether they should ―declare,‖ 
―designate,‖ or ―define‖ laws governing the high seas, but never 
questioned if the clause should reach extraterritorially.
36
 Any doubt that 
the Framers intended to extend jurisdiction over the high seas was quickly 
dispelled by the First Congress‘s passage of ―An Act for the Punishment 
of certain Crimes against the United States‖ (―1790 Act‖),37 which made 
 
 
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether 
by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a 
court.‖ Id. 
 30. Id. § 401(b). Jurisdiction to adjudicate is defined by the Restatement as a state‘s ability ―to 
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in 
criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings.‖ Id. 
 31. Id. § 401(c). Jurisdiction to enforce is defined by the Restatement as the ability ―to induce or 
compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the 
courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.‖ Id. ―Prescriptive 
jurisdiction is the state‘s authority to apply its laws to certain persons or things.‖ Colangelo, supra note 
24, at 126. This concept is used to describe both legislative action, which occurs when Congress 
legitimately extends its lawmaking authority, and judicial action, which occurs when courts announce 
that they have the authority to adjudicate a dispute. Id. Judicial action in the context of prescriptive 
jurisdiction is more commonly referred to as a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Adjudicative 
jurisdiction is a court‘s authority to subject things or individuals to judicial process. Jurisdiction to 
enforce generally involves an exercise of executive power through police, military, or prosecutorial 
action. Id. Analysis of these distinctions generally begins with prescription, as ―[a]djudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction are dependent on the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction—if the legislative 
scope is not broad enough to cover the proscribed conduct, obviously, no adjudication or enforcement 
is appropriate.‖ Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 22, at 12. For the purposes of this Note, I will first 
address jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce because they are less complex issues. 
 32. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 22, at 12. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 34. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 182 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).  
 35. Id. at 315–16. 
 36. See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 372–73 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 37. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. This Act, passed approximately seven months after 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/5
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murder or robbery on the high seas by any person or persons an act of 
piracy punishable by death.
38
  
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution 
and the 1790 Act have also found congressional intent to act 
extraterritorially while still considering international law when extending 
jurisdiction into the high seas. One of the earliest and most revered cases, 
Charming Betsy,
39
 limited the reach of congressional action, noting that 
―an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains.‖40 This theory does not 
mean that the United States cannot enforce laws against foreigners, only 
that the intent to do so must be clearly stated. This is illustrated in a 
subsequent case, United States v. Palmer,
41
 in which Chief Justice 
 
 
the Bill of Rights was proposed to the States, provided the first substantive definition of piracy. For a 
more in-depth analysis of the 1790 Act, see ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 128–44 (1988).  
 38. Section 8 of the 1790 Act provided: 
That, if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas . . . out of the jurisdiction of 
any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the 
body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death . . . every 
such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof 
convicted, shall suffer death. 
1 Stat. 112, 113–14. Section 12 also stated that manslaughter on the high seas was a crime over which 
the United States claimed jurisdiction. See id. at 115. 
 39. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). In Charming Betsy, a 
Danish schooner owner challenged the attempt by the United States to prosecute him under the 
Nonintercourse Act of 1800. The act applied to ―any person or persons resident within the United 
States, or under their protection.‖ Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8. The owner of the 
Charming Betsy argued that applying the Nonintercourse Act to him would violate principles of 
neutrality under international law. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 107. The Court—after 
concluding that he was not under the diplomatic protection of the United States—agreed with the 
owner and concluded that the act did not apply to him. Id. at 118.  
 40. Id. This holding is now referred to as either the ―Charming Betsy Canon‖ or the ―Charming 
Betsy Doctrine,‖ but there is general disagreement over the scope and justification for the doctrine. 
Compare Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory 
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1152–62, 1165–73, 1176–79 (1990) (arguing for a broad 
application of the doctrine), with Curtis Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of 
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998) (arguing 
for a narrow canon based on separation-of-powers grounds while largely ignoring the impact of 
international law). For an in-depth application of the Charming Betsy Canon, see Ingrid B. Wuerth, 
Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 293, 330–57 (2005).  
 41. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1818). In Palmer, the Court was asked 
to determine if Congress intended to apply the 1790 Act to American citizens who committed piracy 
against foreign vessels. Id. at 612–14. The Court determined that Congress did not intend to extend the 
act to American citizens, but noted that questions of jurisdiction over foreigners or parts of foreign 
empires were  
generally rather political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to those 
who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation in such a position with 
respect to foreign powers as to their own judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted 
all its foreign relations . . . . 
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Marshall stated that ―there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to 
enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may 
have committed no particular offence against the United States.‖42  
The Supreme Court has often struggled with balancing the intent to 
subject foreigners to American law with Charming Betsy‘s ―long heeded 
admonition‖ to avoid construing a statute as violative of international law, 
but has determined that international law ―is not . . . any impairment of our 
own sovereignty.‖43  
2. Congressional Intent and the Enactment of the Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act 
Though the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as giving 
Congress the power to regulate the conduct of foreigners on the high seas, 
federal courts require that Congress express the necessary intent to reach 
the proscribed conduct before establishing statutory jurisdiction. In 1980, 
Congress responded to a void in U.S. drug laws
44
 and expressed the 
necessary intent by enacting the first of what would be many attempts to 
control the high seas smuggling of illegal narcotics: ―An Act To facilitate 
 
 
Id. at 634. See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577–78 (1953) (noting that the Palmer Court 
―was called upon to interpret a statute of 1790,‖ and that the legislature did not intend to extend the 
Act to those charged).  
 42. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630 (emphasis added). This intent to apply U.S. laws 
extraterritorially against foreigners was also confirmed by a later interpretation of the 1790 Act by 
Justice William Johnson, who noted that ―when embarked on a piratical cruize [sic], every individual 
becomes equally punishable under the law of 1790, whatever may be his national character, or 
whatever may have been that of the vessel in which he sailed, or of the vessel attacked.‖ United States 
v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 184, 193 (1820). In Furlong, the Court affirmed Palmer and also found 
that the 1790 Act did not intend to extend jurisdiction to acts of piracy committed by ―a foreigner upon 
a foreigner in a foreign ship.‖ Id. at 197. This narrow interpretation of the 1790 Act did not address the 
constitutional power under the Piracies and Felonies Clause. This is evident in United States v. Madera 
Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. 832 (11th Cir. 2006), a recent unpublished opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit, 
which clearly rejected a claim that this interpretation of the 1790 Act somehow limited constitutional 
authority to claim jurisdiction over foreigners on foreign-flagged vessels. ―Simply put, Furlong did not 
involve an interpretation of the Piracies and Felonies Clause, but rather an act of 1790 criminalizing 
piratical murder, and it certainly did not hold that Congress exceeded its authority under the Pirates 
[sic] and Felonies Clause by seeking to regulate drug trafficking on the high seas.‖ Madera Lopez, 190 
Fed. Appx. at 836.  
 43. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578. Even maritime law, which ―is in a peculiar sense an international 
law, . . . depends upon acceptance by the United States‖ before application of any international 
principles of law in United States courts. Id. (quoting Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 
(1949)). Lauritzen dealt with a Danish seaman who brought suit against a Danish owner of a Danish 
vessel under the Jones Act. Id. at 573. The Court held that the law of the flag governed the liability 
because they could ―find no justification for interpreting the Jones Act to intervene between foreigners 
and their own law because of acts on a foreign ship not in our waters.‖ Id. at 593. 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2785, 2785.  
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increased enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws relating to the 
importation of controlled substances.‖45 Though this law ―significantly 
improved the U.S. ability to prosecute drug smugglers,‖46 Congress still 
found it necessary to ―facilitate enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws 
relating to the importation of illegal drugs‖47 by enacting the MDLEA in 
1986.
48
  
That Congress intended for the MDLEA to reach extraterritorially is 
evidenced by the accompanying Congressional finding: ―trafficking in 
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and 
is universally condemned. Moreover, such trafficking presents a specific 
threat to the security and societal well-being of the United States.‖49 
Congressional intent to frame this statute in terms of international law 
while still governing extraterritorial acts is also evident in the limitation 
that only a ―foreign nation‖ may claim a defense of failure to comply with 
international law.
50
 Congress also specified that ―a failure to comply with 
international law shall not divest a court of jurisdiction or otherwise 
constitute a defense to any proceeding.‖51 The MDLEA clearly 
strengthened U.S. drug laws, and subsequent amendments to the MDLEA 
have made the expression of congressional intent even more explicit.
52
 
 
 
 45. 94 Stat. 1159. This act, which was passed in response to a void in U.S. drug laws that did not 
proscribe possession of controlled substances on the high seas, made it ―unlawful for any person on 
board any vessel within the customs waters of the United States . . . to possess with intent to 
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.‖ Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 955(a)). This act was passed because, prior to its enactment, those who were stopped on 
the high seas could only be prosecuted for ―attempted unlawful importation of [drugs] or conspiracy to 
do so.‖ S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1. The government had great difficulty bringing these cases because 
―evidence to prove importation or conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible to obtain.‖ Id. 
at 1–2. This led to the difficult situation where the ―Coast Guard [was] able to seize and confiscate the 
ship and the illegal drugs, but the Government [was] not able to prosecute the crew or others involved 
in the smuggling operation.‖ Id. at 2. 
 46. S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6000. 
 47. S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1. Congress responded to a growing trend amongst ―defendants in 
cases involving foreign or stateless vessel boardings and seizures‖ to rely ―heavily on international 
jurisdictional questions as legal technicalities to escape conviction.‖ S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 15. 
Congress also noted that the Coast Guard was in compliance with international law because it did not 
―board a vessel claiming foreign registry until the foreign nation involved has indicated its consent or 
has denied the vessel‘s claim of registry.‖ Id.  
 48. MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901–1904 (2002) (repealed 2006). 
 49. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902. 
 50. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(d). 
 51. Id. 
 52. In 1996, the United States Congress again felt the need to amend the existing smuggling law 
and passed the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-324, § 1138(a), 110 Stat. 
3901, 3988–89 (1996). This amendment made three key changes in the law. First, paragraph (c) was 
amended so that certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary‘s designee ―conclusively‖ 
proves consent or waiver of objection by foreign nation to the enforcement of United States law and 
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Furthermore, the exercise of authority under the MDLEA does not violate 
established concepts of international law because the United States must 
first receive consent from the country of flag registry in order to stop and 
search a vessel.
53
  
C. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: Its Basis in Domestic Law and Possible 
Violations of International Law 
Before trying an accused, U.S courts require jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
more commonly referred to as personal jurisdiction.
54
 Personal jurisdiction 
is acquired when the defendant appears—voluntarily or involuntarily—
before a trial judge.
55
 U.S. courts have long held that a defendant cannot 
defeat personal jurisdiction by asserting that his presence was procured 
illegally.
56
 This doctrine has been applied internationally, and is often 
referred to as the ―Ker-Frisbie doctrine.‖57  
Establishing personal jurisdiction in smuggling cases where the 
defendant is made to appear before a trial judge is not difficult. According 
to United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
58
 the Ker-Frisbie doctrine may be 
applied internationally, even if doing so violates international law.
59
 In 
 
 
denial of a claim of registry of a claim flag. Id. § 1138(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 3989. Second, paragraph (d) 
was strengthened by adding: ―Any person charged with a violation of this section shall not have 
standing to raise the claim of failure to comply with international law as a basis for a defense.‖ Id. 
§ 1138(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 3989. Third, paragraph (f) was amended to state that ―[j]urisdiction of the 
United States with respect to vessels subject to this chapter is not an element of any offense.‖ Id. 
§ 1138(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 3989. It is evident from President Clinton‘s signing remarks that this 
amendment was specifically enacted to eliminate smugglers‘ use of lack of jurisdiction as a defense. 
Clinton stated:  
This act reaffirms our national resolve to maintain a strong Coast Guard . . . around the world 
to fight drugs . . . . The Act will strengthen drug interdiction by clarifying U.S. jurisdiction 
over vessels in international waters. In particular, the Act makes clear that persons arrested in 
international waters will not be able to challenge the arrest on the ground that the vessel was 
of foreign registry . . . when the vessel was targeted for boarding.  
Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
2112 (Oct. 19, 1996). 
 53. MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(C)–(E) (2002) (repealed 2006). Approval from the 
flag country is statutorily required. Once granted, this consent eliminates what could otherwise be a 
violation of the freedom of the high seas and of the exclusive jurisdictional rights a flag state enjoys 
over its own vessels. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (―UNCLOS‖) art. 94, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (―Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.‖). 
 54. Colangelo, supra note 24, at 126. 
 55. See United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1530–31 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 56. Id. at 1530. 
 57. Id. 
 58. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
 59. Id. at 669–70. 
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Alvarez-Machain, the defendant was a Mexican doctor accused of 
participating in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a DEA agent and 
his pilot in Mexico.
60
 To gain jurisdiction, DEA agents forcibly kidnapped 
the defendant from his home in Mexico and flew him by private plane to 
Texas where he was subsequently arrested.
61
 After the district court 
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that it violated an international 
treaty with Mexico,
62
 the United States Supreme Court reversed.
63
 The 
Court reasoned that the treaty with Mexico did not explicitly outlaw 
forcibly kidnapping individuals and transporting them internationally for 
the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.
64
 
The impact of Alvarez-Machain on personal jurisdiction is that when 
foreign nationals are brought before a court, it is highly unlikely that they 
will be able to use lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. The only 
ground the defendant might have for defeating personal jurisdiction is 
claiming that his or her presence violates due process, an argument 
supported by dicta in United States v. Russell.
65
  
In Russell, the Court stated that ―[w]hile we may some day be 
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents 
is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction,‖ it 
was not present in the instant case.
66
 This holding was then cited by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino
67
 as 
grounds for reversing a case that involved the kidnapping and transporting 
of a drug dealer from Uruguay to the United States for trial. The issue 
 
 
 60. Id. at 657. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 658. 
 63. Id. at 670. 
 64. Id. at 669. The Court addressed neither international common law nor the United Nations 
treaties to which the United States is a signatory that outlaw this method of establishing personal 
jurisdiction. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, which obligates ―[a]ll Members . . . [to] ‗refrain . . . from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . .‖ 
The Security Council has also explicitly ruled that international kidnappings violate the U.N. Charter. 
Following the illegal kidnapping in 1960 of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli ―volunteer 
groups,‖ Argentina filed a formal complaint pursuant to the U.N. Charter. The Security Council, by 
eight votes to none, adopted a resolution condemning the kidnapping and requesting ―the Government 
of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and rules 
of international law.‖ S.C. Res. 4349, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. S/RES/4349 (June 23, 1960). But see United 
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that, ―[u]nder Alvarez-Machain, to 
prevail on an extradition treaty claim, a defendant must demonstrate, by reference to the express 
language of a treaty and/or the established practice thereunder, that the United States affirmatively 
agreed not to seize foreign nationals from the territory of its treaty partner‖). 
 65. 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 500 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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faced by a drug smuggler abducted from the high seas attempting to 
invoke Toscanino is that the Second Circuit‘s opinion focused extensively 
on the seventeen days of abhorrent physical torture the defendant 
suffered.
68
 Since the United States Coast Guard is responsible for the 
arrest and transport of drug smugglers and does not have a history of 
mistreating detainees after arrest, it is unlikely that this would be grounds 
for a successful defense. Additionally, the United States is able to establish 
personal jurisdiction over almost all international drug smuggling 
defendants because most of these individuals are citizens of countries with 
which the United States has entered into bilateral treaties granting the 
United States the right to prosecute.  
D. Prescriptive Jurisdiction: International Legal Principles and Their Use 
by U.S. Courts in Response to Drug Smuggling 
A more difficult prerequisite for U.S. prosecutors attempting to try an 
accused under the MDLEA is establishing prescriptive jurisdiction. 
Modern legal scholarship commonly recognizes five traditional bases for 
prescribing laws governing international crime: territorial, nationality, 
protective, passive personality, and universal.
69
 The territorial principle 
includes both subjective and objective elements,
70
 and allows a state to 
exercise jurisdiction over acts that occur outside said state‘s borders, but 
has, or is intended to have, substantial effect within its territory.
71
 
Jurisdiction based on the principle of nationality extends jurisdiction over 
citizens of a state, wherever they are physically located.
72
 The protective 
 
 
 68. Id. at 270. The Second Circuit‘s graphic portrayal of his torture in the presence of 
government agents is revealing of how persuasive the facts were in its decision.  
Nourishment was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to an amount necessary 
to keep him alive. Reminiscent of the horror stories told by our military men who returned 
from Korea and China, [the defendant] was forced to walk up and down a hallway for seven 
or eight hours at a time. When he could no longer stand he was kicked and beaten but all in a 
manner contrived to punish without scarring. When he would not answer, his fingers were 
pinched with metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids . . .  
were forced up his anal passage. Incredibly, these agents of the United States government 
attached electrodes to [the defendant‘s] earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity 
were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate periods of time 
but again leaving no physical scars. 
Id. 
 69. See Harvard Research in Int‘l Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 
29 AM. J. INT‘L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935); Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 22, at 12. 
 70. Harvard Research in Int‘l Law, supra note 69, at 484, 487–88. 
 71. United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 72. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 22, at 12. This principle has also been interpreted as only 
affecting the perpetrators of a crime if they are nationals of the prescriptive state. Id. 
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principle is a close cousin of the territorial principle and applies when the 
national interest, national security, or national integrity of a state is 
threatened or injured by the conduct of a non-citizen.
73
 The passive 
personality principle is employed to exercise jurisdiction over those who 
commit crimes against nationals of a state, regardless of where the crimes 
are committed.
74
 Universal jurisdiction applies to crimes that are ―so 
universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people‖ 
and any civilized nation is justified in prosecuting these crimes.
75
 Of these, 
U.S. courts are chiefly concerned with the protective, territorial, and 
universal principles when analyzing MDLEA cases. More than one of 
these traditional principles may apply to a specific act, but it is unlikely 
that a court will analyze each in turn. U.S. courts are currently divided 
over how much weight to give these principles in the jurisdiction inquiry,
76
 
but all still consider them necessary for prescriptive analysis.  
The international law principle most analogous to the traditional 
domestic rule of jurisdiction is the territorial principle. The traditional rule 
promulgated by the Supreme Court is that ―[a]cts done outside a 
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects 
within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had 
been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within 
its power.‖77 Though the territorial principle is traditionally applied to 
 
 
 73. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). In Aluminum Co., 
the United States brought an action against the Aluminum Company of America for monopolistic 
practices under the Sherman Act. Id. at 421–22. One argument made on behalf of Aluminum Co. was 
that the Sherman Act did not apply because most of the agreements the company entered into were 
made beyond U.S. territory and were not intended to affect the U.S. market. Id. at 443. Judge Hand 
rejected this argument and stated ―that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within 
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.‖ Id. 
 74. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rezaq, a Palestinian, hijacked 
an Air Egypt flight in Greece and forced it to fly to Malta, where he eventually murdered two 
individuals, including an American citizen. Id. at 1126. After serving time in a Maltese jail, he was 
freed and subsequently arrested by the FBI, charged with air piracy under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(n), 
and convicted. Id. at 1126–27. On appeal, the Circuit rejected the defendant‘s claim that applying U.S. 
law to him violated the normal jurisdictional rules of international law by stating that ―[i]nternational 
law imposes limits on a state‘s ‗jurisdiction to prescribe,‘ that is, its ability to render its law applicable 
to persons or activities outside its borders . . . .‖ Id. at 1133.  
 75. Demjanuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 76. Compare Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162 (stating that these international law principles ―may be 
useful as a rough guide‖ for determining if prescriptive jurisdiction is established, but cautioning that 
there is danger in placing too much emphasis on them (citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 
249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990))), with United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating 
definitively that ―[i]n determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by principles of 
international law‖).  
 77. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
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disputes wholly within the United States, it can also be applied to 
international cases if the United States can show that a defendant intended 
to harm the United States. In a case arising out of the same kidnapping, 
torture, and murder that gave rise to Alvarez-Machain, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that ―drug smuggling by its very nature involves foreign countries, 
and . . . the accomplishment of the crime always requires some action in a 
foreign country,‖ and the U.S. has jurisdiction over infractions of U.S. 
laws internationally.
78
 Though this decision did not involve application of 
the MDLEA, the court‘s focus on congressional intent to reach ―acts 
occurring outside the United States‘ borders that have effects within the 
national territory‖ is applicable to MDLEA cases.79 In the MDLEA, 
Congress expressed the requisite intent to allow extraterritorial 
application,
80
 and a majority of circuits consider this sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction.  
The logic of using the territorial principle to claim jurisdiction on the 
high seas has been approved by at least one Supreme Court justice. In 
United States v. Robinson,
81
 then First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Breyer ruled that the Marijuana on the High Seas Act could be applied to a 
Panamanian registered vessel because ―a state has jurisdiction to prescribe 
and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the extent 
provided by international agreement with the other state.‖82 This decision 
also addressed what has become a contentious issue: whether the act 
violates due process by not giving fair notice to foreign nationals that they 
might be subject to U.S. law. The First Circuit determined that fair notice 
existed because it was written into the statute and it had previously been 
enforced.
83
  
 
 
 78. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204 (internal quotations omitted). 
 79. Id. at 1205–06. The Ninth Circuit has refused to extend the territorial principle to MDLEA 
cases, noting that ―[t]he fact that the Government received [the flag nation‘s] consent to seize the 
[defendants], remove them to the United States, and prosecute them under United States law . . . does 
not eliminate the [need to establish jurisdiction].‖ Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1169. 
 80. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902. 
 81. United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988). The importance of Robinson as a final 
adjudication of the nexus argument cannot be understated, as it is the only decision by a sitting 
Supreme Court justice that addresses the need for a nexus before a U.S. claim of jurisdiction. Justice 
Breyer succinctly rejected the need for a nexus by stating that a ―perfectly adequate basis in 
international law [existed] for the assertion of American jurisdiction. Panama agreed to permit the 
United States to apply its law on her ship. . . . [T]he Panamanian government gave its ‗authorization‘ 
not only ‗to board, inspect, search, seize and escort the vessel to the United States,‘ but also ‗to 
prosecute the persons aboard the vessel.‘‖ Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 82. Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 5–6. 
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A second international law principle often employed when claiming 
jurisdiction over drug smuggling is the protective principle. Justification 
for its use is based on the fact that ―[d]rug trafficking presents the sort of 
threat to our nation‘s ability to function that merits application of the 
protective principle of jurisdiction.‖84 The First Circuit expressly found 
that this principle allows extraterritorial application ―because Congress has 
determined that all drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens our nation‘s 
security.‖85 The Ninth Circuit has rejected this view, noting that the 
―danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us 
to lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to 
the defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?‖86 The Ninth Circuit 
therefore requires that prosecutors bear the additional burden of 
establishing a nexus to the United States as a prerequisite for establishing 
jurisdiction.
87
  
Another international law principle employed by a small minority of 
courts to establish jurisdiction is the universal theory. This theory is not 
commonly invoked, as it ―is simply a weaker version of the . . . protective 
principle‖ and requires a finding that the questionable conduct is 
universally condemned.
88
 One of the few circuits to employ this principle 
is the Eleventh, which has done so twice.
89
 
 
 
 84. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1987). Peterson, a case involving over 
twelve tons of marijuana smuggled from Thailand, was the first time the Ninth Circuit incorporated 
language concerning the need for a nexus. The court, rejecting a constitutional challenge by the 
defendants, concluded ―that there was more than a sufficient nexus with the United States to allow the 
exercise of jurisdiction. There was substantial evidence that the drugs were bound ultimately for the 
United States.‖ Id. at 493. Interestingly, the Court also stated that ―drug trafficking may be prevented 
under the protective principle of jurisdiction, without any showing of an actual effect on the United 
States.‖ Id.  
 85. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 86. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162 (citing Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1162–63 (internal quotations omitted). 
 89. In United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir. 1985), the court rejected the 
defendants‘ due process claims on grounds that the smuggling they engaged in ―is generally 
recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems.‖ Though this court‘s 
reliance on the congressional determination that smuggling met this criterion is somewhat troubling 
given the lack of any evidence supporting it at the time, this concern has since been alleviated by the 
ratification of a U.N. charter. When the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was signed in 1988, the signatories confirmed that they were 
―[d]eeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and 
welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of 
society. . . .‖ U.N. Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, Austria, Nov. 25–Dec. 20, 1988, Final Act, 1. The treaty is 
now ratified by 184 nations, including the United States. This vast support indicates that drug 
trafficking is universally condemned. U.N. Convention Against Traffic in Illicit Narcotics, Status of 
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT‘S NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND ITS FAILURE TO 
CONSIDER PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS WHEN CONSIDERING EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Constitutional Nexus Requirement 
In addition to finding statutory, prescriptive, and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction prior to subjecting an MDLEA defendant to U.S. laws, the 
Ninth Circuit has determined that defendants are entitled to due process 
rights that require the United States to show a ―nexus‖ for an 
extraterritorial prosecution.
90
 This requirement forces the government to 
establish a connection between the defendant and the United States, which 
is generally interpreted to require establishing that the drugs were destined 
for the United States.
91
 The stated rationale for this requirement is that 
prosecutions within the United States, especially of foreigners, must not be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.
92
 The Ninth Circuit has determined that 
this application of domestic law is required because it believes that 
international legal principles are insufficient for analyzing a constitutional 
right.
93
 
The nexus requirement has been rejected by every other circuit that has 
addressed the issue. In United States v. Perez-Oviedo,
94
 the Third Circuit 
expressly rejected this requirement by holding that § 1903(d) ―expresses 
the necessary congressional intent to override international law to the 
extent that international law might require a nexus to the United States for 
the prosecution of offenses‖ under the MDLEA.95 The Third Circuit then 
 
 
Treaty Adherence as of 9 Aug. 2008, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (follow 
―Chapter VI‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Section 19‖ hyperlink). The United States ratified this treaty on 
February 20, 1990. The Ninth Circuit‘s recent flat rejection of this principle is thus troubling, as it fails 
to consider the impact of disregarding a treaty that the United States was integral in crafting and 
pressured many countries into adopting. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162–63. 
 90. See, e.g., Davis, 905 F.2d 245; United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 
1998); Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1149. The Ninth Circuit has determined that this requirement is part of the 
jurisdictional inquiry and is to be decided by the court. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257. This is 
supported by the 1996 amendment to the MDLEA, which removed jurisdiction over the vessel from 
the elements of the offense and made it a question of law for the trial court. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f) 
(1996).  
 91. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257–58. 
 92. Davis, 905 F.2d at 249. 
 93. Id. at 249 n.2 (noting that ―danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will 
cause us to lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the defendant be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?‖).  
 94. United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 95. Id. at 403. In Perez-Oviedo, the Third Circuit clarified that its earlier decision in United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1054 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048, 
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unwittingly invoked the territorial principle of international law by stating 
that because the flag nation had consented to the application of U.S. law, 
jurisdiction was proper.
96
 In United States v. Suerte,
97
 the Fifth Circuit 
used a similar rationale in rejecting the nexus requirement, but also relied 
on Congress‘s express power to impose jurisdiction under the Piracies and 
Felonies Clause.
98
 The First Circuit also rejected the nexus based on the 
territorial principle, but explicitly framed its rationale in terms of 
international legal principles.
99
 
The international legal principles that American courts use to justify 
extraterritorial jurisdiction do not require a nexus.
100
 This requirement is 
not supported by the protective principle, which Congress clearly 
attempted to invoke in the language employed in § 1902.
101
 This additional 
requirement is also unrealistic because it grants defendants added due 
process protections that only make it more difficult for the United States to 
govern the universally condemned drug trade.
102
 In addition, the nexus 
requirement makes it more difficult for the United States to fulfill its treaty 
 
 
(1994), was intended as an explicit rejection of the nexus requirement in all cases. The court stated: 
We acknowledged in our discussion that our holding in Martinez-Hidalgo was not joining the 
holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Davis, which read 
into the MDLEA a nexus requirement with respect to foreign-registered vessels.  
 In holding that there was no nexus requirement in the MDLEA, we refused to distinguish 
Martinez-Hidalgo from Davis on the basis of whether the ship involved was stateless or 
actually registered in another country. 
Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 402 (internal citation omitted). 
 96. Id. at 403. 
 97. United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 372–73 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. 
 100. Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2. Davis was the first time the Ninth Circuit clearly enunciated its 
rationale for the nexus requirement. The Court stated that ―[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a 
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus 
between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.‖ Id. at 248–49 (internal citation omitted). Davis acknowledged that the Circuit‘s 
previous case law did not have this requirement. See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
966 (1977). But the court noted the danger of emphasizing international law principles over 
determining whether application of the statute is fundamentally unfair. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2. 
 101. See 46 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000). 
 102. Interview with William Gallo (Nov. 11, 2007). One of the major issues encountered by 
federal prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to prove that 
shipments of drugs are headed towards the United States. Id. Previously, proving a nexus was not 
difficult because the only market that could absorb a shipment of multiple tons of cocaine was the 
United States. This has changed as the consumption of drugs has grown in Europe and Asia. Now, 
many drug smugglers will head into the Western Pacific so that they can argue that their drugs were 
headed for Russia, a major transshipment point for the European drug market. Id. 
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obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 
The difficulties raised by the nexus requirement are evident in the 
prosecution of the crew of the Gran Tauro. In October of 2001, the crew 
was tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California and found guilty of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute aboard a vessel.
103
 The district court found that the nexus 
requirement was satisfied because the crew had aided and abetted the crew 
of the Go-Fast boat, a stateless vessel that did not need a nexus to establish 
jurisdiction.
104
 The court reasoned that, as aiders-and-abettors, the crew of 
the Gran Tauro ―stand in the shoes of the principals, specifically the Go-
Fast defendants, for jurisdiction purposes.‖105 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
 
 
 103. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1157. 
 104. Id. at 1158. The district court originally determined that the Go-Fast boat was a stateless 
vessel, but this was overturned by the Ninth Circuit, which claimed that this was still in dispute. Id. at 
1165. Evidence of the lack of flag status of the Go-Fast is that crew of the De Wert testified that ―they 
saw no flags of any kind, no markings of any kind, no hull numbers, no name on the boat, and no 
home-port inscription.‖ Id. When questioned by Coast Guard officers about the flag status of the 
vessel, one of the crew also responded, ―‗Barco no tengo bandera,‘ which literally means, ‗Boat I have 
no flag.‘‖ Id. The Ninth Circuit found a question of fact existed because some of the crew said that 
both they and their boat were from Colombia. Also, one member of the crew claimed that the boat was 
captained by one ―Freddy,‖ who was the only one who knew what the boat was doing and was never 
found. Id. at 1165. Stateless vessels have a unique position in international law because the relatively 
stringent jurisdictional requirements established to protect the sovereignty of nations over their own 
vessels do not apply to vessels that do not sail under the flag of a known state. Id. at 1161. This unique 
position is grounded in centuries-old international legal principles aimed at stopping piracy. In the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, piracy threatened travel and commerce on the high seas and 
all civilized nations banded together to fight the threat. The United States‘ particular concern with 
piracy—necessary because of their reliance on maritime trade with Europe—is evident in piracy‘s 
inclusion among the enumerated crimes in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. This 
concern is particularly noteworthy because piracy, treason, and felonies on the high seas, are the only 
enumerated crimes in the entire Constitution. Congress also has the authority under this enumeration to 
―define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.‖ Id. The inclusion of this phrase has been 
interpreted as delegating to international law the right to define piracy and those crimes that are a 
threat to all nations. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 153 (1820). See also United States v. Cortes, 
588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding stateless vessels claim no sovereign); United States v. 
Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that stateless vessels enjoy little if any 
protection from international law). This protection also does not extend to vessels that attempt to claim 
the protection of multiple states. International treaties often state that vessels that do not sail under the 
flag of a single nation are subject to the jurisdiction of every nation. Id. 
 105. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161. This represents another contradiction in the Ninth Circuit‘s 
reasoning, as the nexus is meant to ensure that application of U.S. law is not arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair, Davis, 905 F.2d at 249, which is the equivalent of notice. Those who are aboard a stateless 
vessel have no greater notice than those aboard a foreign flagged vessel that they may be subject to 
U.S. law. This distinction also exhibits how the Ninth Circuit ignores its contention that the nexus 
―serves the same purpose as the ‗minimum contacts‘ test in personal jurisdiction,‖ United States v. 
Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 829 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1156 (2004), because minimum contacts requires that a defendant be aware that he or she may be 
subject to American law; those on board stateless vessels are not thus aware. 
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this determination and freed the defendants.
106
 Prosecutors found this 
decision especially confusing because the Ninth Circuit had previously 
stated that the aider-and-abettor theory could be used to establish 
jurisdiction.
107
 This confusion, coupled with the lack of basis in 
international or national law, will most likely be the rationale upon which 
the Supreme Court rejects the nexus requirement when it eventually hears 
a case on this vital jurisdictional issue.  
B. Enforcement of the MDLEA in Relation to International Agreements 
and Their Ability to Counteract the Need For a Nexus 
The extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over 
vessels on the high seas is not supported by traditional maritime freedoms 
incorporated into Article 87 of the UNCLOS as ―freedom of the high 
seas.‖108 This article‘s broad statement of freedom of navigation, over 
flight, construction, and economic exploitation
109
 ensures that a flag nation 
has assurances that its vessels will not be subject to the whims of a more 
powerful country like the United States. The treaty also incorporates the 
traditional concept of limited jurisdiction on the high seas by stating: 
―[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, 
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.‖110 Though 
these passages express the basic intent behind UNCLOS, the 
extraterritorial extension of the MDLEA is supported by other language 
within the treaty. 
The drafters of UNCLOS, responding to the known need to regulate the 
drug trade on the high seas, included Article 108 in the final convention. 
This article requires that ―[a]ll States shall cooperate in the suppression of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by 
ships on the high seas contrary to international conventions.‖111 Of special 
note is the drafters‘ use of the word ―shall,‖ which creates an affirmative 
duty on the part of each signatory to aid in stopping the illicit trade. 
Though the United States is not a treaty signatory, its willingness to use its 
vast resources, courts, and enforcement power helps lift this burden from 
many South and Central American countries that may otherwise lack the 
 
 
 106. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1168–69. 
 107. See Klimavicius-Viloria, 114 F.3d at 1263. 
 108. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. art. 92. 
 111. Id. art. 108. 
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resources necessary to fulfill this portion of the convention. The legality of 
U.S. policy is also enhanced by the treaty‘s allowance that ―[a]ny State 
which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is 
engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may 
request the cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic.‖112 The 
United States complies with this portion of the treaty by providing the flag 
state with the reasonable grounds for believing that their ship is 
transporting drugs.  
The enforcement of U.S. laws against foreign-flagged vessels also 
complies with the UNCLOS enforcement provisions, which require:  
States shall, at the written request of any State, investigate any 
violation alleged to have been committed by vessels flying their 
flag. If satisfied that sufficient evidence is available to enable 
proceedings to be brought in respect of the alleged violation, flag 
States shall without delay institute such proceedings in accordance 
with their laws.
113
 
The assistance provided by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard satisfies 
this requirement, and any possible violations related to applying the law of 
the flag state are avoided because many of the bilateral treaties the United 
States has entered into grant it jurisdictional authority over drug crimes on 
the high seas. The United States also satisfies the notice requirements of 
UNCLOS found in article 231
114
 by always contacting the flag state of a 
vessel before attempting to board. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over drug smuggling on the high seas is 
also legal because it fulfills obligations the United States agreed to by 
ratifying the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
115
 Signatories to the treaty are 
required to provide mutual legal assistance in prosecuting criminal 
offenses in connection with the treaty.
116
 To fulfill this obligation, the 
treaty allows jurisdiction to be established whenever ―[t]he offence is 
committed on board a vessel concerning which that Party has been 
authorized to take appropriate action pursuant to article 17, provided that 
 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. art. 217. 
 114. Id. art. 231. This article requires that ―[s]tates shall promptly notify the flag State and any 
other State concerned of any measures taken pursuant to section 6 against foreign vessels, and shall 
submit to the flag State all official reports concerning such measures.‖ Id. 
 115. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493. 
 116. Id. art. 7, para. 1. 
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such jurisdiction shall be exercised only on the basis of agreements or 
arrangements referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of that article.‖117 The 
treaty also allows signatories to ―take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the alleged offender is 
present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party.‖118 
The explicit language of the treaty and its silence regarding a nexus leaves 
no doubt that signatories may allow other signatory nations to exert 
jurisdiction over vessels that fly their flag if the crews of such vessels are 
found to be participating in drug smuggling on the high seas.  
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
The United States‘ exercise of jurisdiction over drug smugglers 
operating on the high seas may not further general maritime theories of 
openness and autonomy, but it does comply with international legal 
theories and treaties enacted to combat this serious threat to national 
stability. These theories, based on precedent that is hundreds of years old, 
have been adopted by the international community in order to regulate the 
greatest shared expanse of the common heritage of mankind and should 
not be altered by the Ninth Circuit‘s misguided attempt to extend 
Constitutional protection to those engaged in a universally condemned act. 
The Ninth Circuit‘s decision to reject the use of international legal 
principles and free the crew of the Gran Tauro is but one example of why 
the United States Supreme Court should take up this issue and definitively 
decide that international legal theory is appropriately applied when 
establishing jurisdiction over those who decide to violate international and 
domestic laws. If the Court fails to rule in this fashion, it will also place 
lower courts in the unenviable position of having to ignore international 
treaties and agreements that require the United States to aid other nations 
in the constant struggle against the illicit narcotics trade.  
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